Explanation:

Salesforce mobile applications (like the Salesforce1/Lightning Mobile App) do not directly use the SAML protocol itself. Instead, they use OAuth 2.0 flows for authorization. For SAML SSO to work on mobile, the flow is as follows:

Salesforce1 App Redirects: The mobile app starts the OAuth flow, which redirects the user's embedded browser to the Salesforce login page.
My Domain is Essential (D): The login request must be sent to the org's custom My Domain URL (https://mydomain.lightning.force.com or https://mydomain.my.salesforce.com) rather than the generic instance URL (https://na99.salesforce.com). My Domain is mandatory to enable the custom login page that includes the SSO authentication provider button. Therefore, the app needs to be configured to use this URL.
SSO Authentication (B): When the My Domain login page loads in the app's embedded web browser, the user is presented with the option to log in using the external Identity Provider (IDP) via the configured SSO button. The embedded browser is then responsible for the actual SAML communication (the redirect to the IDP, the SAML assertion, etc.).

A. Use the existing SAML SSO flow along with user agent flow. The Salesforce mobile app uses an OAuth flow, specifically the OAuth 2.0 User-Agent Flow (or a similar hybrid flow for native apps) to get an access token. While the flow internally uses a SAML-based authentication by redirecting to the SSO-enabled login page, simply stating "use user agent flow" is incomplete and is a description of the OAuth component, not the necessary configuration step to enforce SAML.

C. Use the existing SAML SSO flow along with Web server flow. The OAuth 2.0 Web Server Flow is used for web-based or desktop applications that can securely store a Consumer Secret, which is not the typical pattern for a publicly distributed mobile app like Salesforce1.

B & D. Configure the embedded Web browser/Salesforce1 app to use My Domain URL. These are the critical configuration steps. Setting the mobile app to use the My Domain URL ensures the user lands on the proper login page that has been configured to display the SAML Single Sign-On button. This successfully forces the user through the existing SAML SSO process.

Explanation:

Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) adds an extra layer of security by requiring users to verify their identity using something they know (password) and something they have (e.g., mobile device, authenticator app). This helps mitigate several common security risks:

✅ B. Public Wi-Fi Access
Public networks are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks.
Even if a user's password is intercepted, 2FA prevents unauthorized access because the attacker lacks the second factor.

✅ C. Reused Passwords
Many users reuse passwords across platforms (e.g., Facebook, email, Salesforce).
If another service is compromised, attackers may try the same credentials on Salesforce.
2FA blocks access unless the attacker also has the second factor.

❌ Why the other options are less relevant:
A. Unattended laptops: 2FA is triggered at login, not when a session is already active. This is better mitigated by session timeout policies.
D. Simple password reset questions: 2FA doesn’t directly affect password recovery mechanisms — this is mitigated by strong password policies and secure recovery flows.

Explanation:

The policy requires re-verification of a device if an employee hasn't logged in from it for a week. In the context of a mobile app using OAuth, the "login" event is the use of a refresh token to obtain a new access token. The refresh token represents the persistent approval for that specific device to access Salesforce.

Let's evaluate each option:

B. Refresh Token Policy - Expire the refresh token if it has not been used for 7 days. This is the precise and correct setting. A refresh token is considered "used" when the mobile app calls the Salesforce token endpoint to get a new access token. If the app is unused for 7 days, the refresh token will expire. The next time the user opens the app, it will find its refresh token invalid and will be forced to re-authenticate (e.g., via the login screen), which constitutes the required "re-verification" of the device. This enforces the policy automatically and declaratively.

A. Scope - Deny refresh_token scope for this connected app. This is incorrect and would break the intended functionality. Denying the refresh_token scope would mean the mobile app only gets short-lived access tokens and users would have to log in repeatedly, likely more than once a week. This is a heavy-handed approach that destroys the user experience and doesn't intelligently enforce the specific 7-day inactivity policy.

C. Session Policy - Set timeout value of the connected app to 7 days. This is incorrect. A session policy in Salesforce governs the lifetime of the access token and the user's session within Salesforce, not the device's persistent authorization. An access token is short-lived (typically a few hours). Setting its timeout to 7 days would be a major security risk and does not control the long-lived refresh token, which is the key to this requirement.

D. Permitted User - Ask admins to maintain a list of users who are permitted based on last login date. This is highly impractical and error-prone. It would require administrators to manually track the last login date for every user and every device, then manually revoke access via the "Manage Connected Apps" page on each user's record. This does not scale, is not automated, and is not a reliable way to enforce a security policy.

Summary:
The Refresh Token Policy is the correct mechanism because it directly controls the persistent authorization grant for the device. By setting the "Refresh Token Expiration" to a fixed interval (e.g., "Expire refresh token after 7 days of inactivity"), you force re-authentication exactly as the security policy requires, without impacting active users.

Reference:
Salesforce Help: "Connected App Policies"
The documentation for "Refresh Token Policy" allows you to set how long a refresh token is valid, including the option "Expire refresh token after *n* days of inactivity." This setting is designed for exactly this type of compliance requirement.

Explanation:

In the described SSO setup, an Identity Provider (IdP) is responsible for authenticating users and issuing identity assertions (e.g., SAML assertions or OAuth tokens) to Service Providers (SPs). Based on the scenario:
Salesforce Org 2 uses SAML and is the first system users log into, indicating it authenticates users and likely issues SAML assertions to other systems (e.g., Salesforce Org 1, Financial System, or CPQ). Thus, it acts as an IdP.
Pingfederate is a common third-party IdP that supports SAML and can authenticate users, issuing SAML assertions to Salesforce Org 2 or other systems. Given its mention in the SAML-based flow, it is likely acting as an IdP.

Why not the others?
A. Financial System: This system is accessed later in the day and likely acts as a Service Provider, relying on SAML assertions or OAuth tokens from an IdP (e.g., Pingfederate or Salesforce Org 2) for authentication, not as an IdP itself.
D. Salesforce Org 1: Uses OAuth 2.0 and is accessed after Salesforce Org 2, suggesting it acts as a Service Provider that receives authentication from an IdP (likely Salesforce Org 2 or Pingfederate) rather than authenticating users itself.

References:
Salesforce Help: Identity Provider and Service Provider
Trailhead: Identity Basics

Explanation:

Why:
Users start on the employee portal (a server-side web app) and then jump into Salesforce pages already authenticated. The OAuth 2.0 Web Server flow is designed for server-based apps that can keep a client secret: it does an interactive browser redirect to Salesforce, the user authenticates, the portal receives an auth code, exchanges it for an access token (session), and can then deep-link the user into Salesforce (e.g., via frontdoor.jsp?sid=&retURL=...) to show the target Ideas page.

Eliminate the others:
A. Web Application flow — Not a standard Salesforce term; the intended server-side browser flow is Web Server.
B. SAML Bearer Assertion — Headless token grant for back-end jobs, not interactive user navigation into UI pages.
C. User-Agent flow — For browser-only/SPA clients (implicit grant). The portal is server-based and should use the more secure Web Server flow.